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Road to Nowhere or Jurisprudential U-Turn?
The Intersection of Punitive Damage Class
Actions and the Due Process Clause
James M. Underwood*
Abstract
This Article analyzes the likely impact of recent Supreme Court
jurisprudence applying substantive and procedural due process limits on
punitive damage awards to class action punitive damage lawsuits. In BMW v.
Gore and State Farm v. Campbell the Supreme Court adopted a tripartite
analysis to determine whether punitive damage awards were excessive under
the Due Process Clause. Just last year in Philip Morris v. Williams the Court
took a step further by imposing the additional 'procedural" limitation that
requires trial courts to take steps to ensure that juries do not punish a
tortfeasor through an award ofpunitive damages in one case for harm caused
to anyone other than the plaintiff. There has been some recent scholarly
speculation that these cases signal an end to the punitive damage class action
by insisting upon an individualized focus for punitive damages that precludes
class-wide determinations. In the last year, some lower federal courts have
agreed with this view and denied class certification.
This Article offers a very different reading of these recent Supreme Court
opinions, illustrating that the Court's primary concern in these cases has been
the possibility of redundant awards ofpunitive damages by multiple juries in
different cases. Thus viewed, increased certification ofpunitive damage class
actions provides a more effective and efficient means of avoiding the redundant
punishment problem. Further, Philip Morris creates a paradoxical command
to trial courts-to permit juries to consider evidence of third-party harm in
order to assess the "reprehensibility" of a tortfeasor's misconduct but not to
allow the jury to use that same evidence to set the award ofpunitive damages.
* Associate Professor, Baylor University School of Law. I want to thank my colleagues
and the administration of Baylor Law School for providing me with the sabbatical time to
research and write this Article. Special thanks also go to Gavin Smith and Sophia Lauricella for
their helpful research assistance.
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This dictate will prove impossible for lower courts to implement and actually
offers defendants no benefit. Certification of class actions, however, avoids
this inexorable problem by transforming the "third-parties" into litigant class
members, thereby rending moot the needfor the subtle distinctions embodied in
Philip Morris. In essence, rather than portend the death of the punitive
damage class action, the recent Supreme Court jurisprudence creates powerful
new arguments in favor of the aggregate model of punitive damage
adjudication that offers a route back toward the viable use of class actions in
mass tort scenarios.
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I. Introduction
Sometimes judicial decrees have unintended consequences and often their
full ramifications are not clear until some significant passage of time. In the
instance of the U.S. Supreme Court's evolving jurisprudence on the Due
Process Clause's substantive and procedural limits on punitive damage awards,
there is much room to wonder where the current path leads. Will the Court
reconsider the path it has chosen, perhaps finding some wisdom in Justice
Scalia's admonitions that the Court is on a "road to nowhere"?' If not, will the
Court stick with the current tripartite analysis derived from its seminal decision
in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore2-a model that blends a nebulous
1. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 605 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
2. See id. at 585-86 (determining that a $2 million punitive damages award was grossly
excessive and thus exceeded constitutional limits under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause). Gore established a three "guideposts" test to determine if a person received
fair notice of the severity of a punitive damages award that might be entered against him. Id at
574-75.
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standard (reprehensibility) with what appears to be a bright-line mathematical
formula (single-digit ratio of punitive-to-actual damages) and a throw-away
factor often having no application whatsoever (consideration of other civil
penalties)? 3 Where will the Court go next given the additional considerations
that it has not yet addressed? "Such issues are of intense practical importance
to litigants and lower court judges alike.
4
The Supreme Court appears to be doing a jurisprudential Sunday
afternoon drive-meandering about the countryside making decisions as they
present themselves with no clear destination in mind. A turn one direction may
make some sense but what impact will this turn make down the road? In that
regard, there are many important questions unanswered about punitive
damages. While many thoughtful criticisms could be waged against these
recent decisions, the focus of this Article is the legal fallout. One of the most
intriguing, and practically significant, areas of uncertainty lies at the
intersection of the Due Process Clause and a putative class action for punitive
damages. What do Gore and the recent Philip Morris USA v. Williams5
decision portend for a litigant's ability to obtain a grant or denial of the
certification of a punitive damage class action? Both legal commentators and
judges have recently begun to opine on this issue and have reached some
divergent conclusions, though the prevailing thought seems to be that the
Supreme Court has enunciated a death sentence for punitive damage class
actions.6 The basis for this view is that the Court's recent jurisprudence has
highlighted the individual nature of the punitive damage inquiry in a way that
makes it antagonistic to being considered a common issue suitable for class-
wide adjudication.7
Part II of this Article provides a focused recapitulation of the recent U.S.
Supreme Court's cases on punitive damages, starting with its 1991 suggestion
that the Due Process Clause provides substantive limits on punitive damage
awards and ending with its 2007 decision offering new, so-called "procedural"
limits on such awards. Part II identifies and discusses the Supreme Court's
3. See id. (setting out a tripartite analysis for reviewing punitive damage awards).
4. Michael P. Allen, Of Remedy, Juries, and State Regulation ofPunitive Damages: The
Significance of Philip Morris v. Williams, 63 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 343, 381 (2008).
5. See Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1063 (2007) (finding that the
Due Process Clause forbids ajury from basing a punitive damages award in part upon a desire
to punish a defendant for injury inflicted upon nonparties to the instant action).
6. See infra notes 153-73 and accompanying text (discussing the opinions of scholars
and judges on certification of punitive damages class actions after Philip Morris).
7. See infra note 163 and accompanying text (discussing the disjoint between the Court's
individual harm standard for punitive damage awards and a punitive damage class action trial
plan).
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concerns that originally motivated these decisions; these concerns should prove
useful in understanding the breadth of the ripples emanating from these cases.
Part III of the Article brings into focus the class action aggregation device
and analyzes how, during the last few decades, a request for punitive damages
has impacted the certifiability of a class action under Rule 23(b)(l)-(3).' Part
m then squarely raises the quandary concerning how the recent Supreme Court
jurisprudence on Due Process Clause limits may impact certification of punitive
damage class actions, discussing both scholarly and judicial viewpoints that
have emerged in the last few years on the topic. This discussion will
demonstrate the suggestion among some legal scholars that the Due Process
Clause-as interpreted recently by the Supreme Court-is simply inconsistent
with class-wide treatment of the issue of civil punishment. This Article will
then offer a different interpretation of these developments-that these cases
actually broaden the path for certification of a punitive damage class action,
particularly in Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) cases.
Rather than portend the death knell for certification of punitive damage
class actions, it appears that the Supreme Court's due process tinkering with
state civil law on punishment has created new incentives for, and justifications
of, the aggregate model for considering civil punishment of a tortfeasor,
particularly in contexts involving mass torts. The irony is that it is the very
same due process concerns with punitive damage assessment in the traditional
one-on-one model, coupled with the paradox created by the Court's attempted
fix of that problem in Philip Morris, that makes the new case for certification.
II. Judicial Tort Reform of Punitive Damages
For the most part, during the first 200 years of the U.S. experience with its
Constitution, the Supreme Court let state courts dole out punitive damage
awards with no significant federal oversight, so long as basic procedural
niceties such as notice and an opportunity to participate in the adjudication
were observed. 9 The last few decades, however, have been marked by cries for
8. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b)(1)-(3) (establishing the grounds for maintaining class action
suits).
9. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 417 (2003) (noting
that "a person [must) receive fair notice... of the severity of the penalty that a State may
impose") (quoting BMW ofN. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996)); Gore, 517 U.S. at
599 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("What the Fourteenth Amendment's procedural guarantee assures is
an opportunity to contest the reasonableness of a damages judgment in state court ....
(citations omitted).
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tort reform of both the legislative and judicial varieties.'0 Perhaps as a natural
or expected consequence of the era of tort reform, the Supreme Court's
centuries-old respect for state autonomy" in the area of punitive damage
control of socially abhorrent behavior finally cracked. This change first
appeared in 1991 when the Supreme Court for the first time realized that the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause served to provide a substantive
limit on a jury's power to punish tortfeasors. The Court held in Pacific Mutual
Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip12 that punitive damage awards that "jar one's
constitutional sensibilities" in terms of their size were constitutionally
prohibited.' 3 The Court stated that juries' assessments of punitive damage
awards had "run wild" '14-though in that particular case the Court let stand a
200-to- I punitive-to-compensatoryjury verdict against insurers.15 While recent
empirical studies and actual litigation experiences16 offer some refutation of the
Court's allegiance to tort reformers' agenda, the Court's suggestion of a need
for judicial oversight of punitive damages was just beginning.1
7
10. See generally David A. Anderson, Judicial Tort Reform in Texas, 26 REv. LITIG. 1
(2007) (discussing various manifestations ofjudicial tort reform); David C. Johnson, TheAttack
on Trial Lawyers and Tort Law, COMMONWEAL INST. REP. (2003) (analyzing the tort reform
movement and arguing that it is ideologically associated with conservative organizations).
11. See Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, Putting the Cart Before the Horse:
The Prejudicial Practice of a "Reverse Bifurcation" Approach to Punitive Damages, 2
CHARLESTON L. REv. 375, 391 (2008) (commenting upon the Supreme Court's historic
reluctance to entertain constitutional challenges to punitive damages awards and how this began
to change in the 1990s).
12. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 19 (1991) (finding that jury
instructions did not give the jury unlimited discretion in imposing a punitive damages award
such that the award violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
13. Id. at 18.
14. Id.
15. See id at 23-24 (recognizing that the punitive damages award was "more than 200
times the out-of-pocket expenses of respondent," but nevertheless concluding the award did "not
cross the line into the area of constitutional impropriety").
16. See, e.g., Larry Lyon, Bradley J.B. Toben, James Underwood, William Underwood &
Jim Wren, Straight from the Horse's Mouth: Judicial Observations of Jury Verdicts and the
Need for Tort Reform, 59 BAYLOR L. REv. 419, 430-31 (2007) (indicating that in a survey
conducted of all Texas state trial judges, the overwhelming majority found no evidence in their
courtrooms during the preceding four years of excessive awards of punitive damages and no
need for further tort reform).
17. Just a few years earlier, the Court rejected an argument that the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition on excessive fines applied to civil jury verdicts awarding punitive damages.
Browning-Ferris Indust. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 259 (1989) (finding that "the
Eighth Amendment['s] ... Excessive Fines Clause does not apply to awards of punitive
damages in cases between private parties").
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Just two years later, the Supreme Court considered a challenge to a
punitive damage award that represented a 526-to-I ratio of punitive damages to
actual damages. In TXO Produce Corp. v. Alliance Resource Corp.,18 the
Court again reiterated the need to review substantively large punitive damage
verdicts. Considering the facts of that case, however, the Court nevertheless
affirmed a relatively large award of punitive damages after reviewing the
verdict in light of multiple traditional factors for determining punitive damages.
These factors included the egregious nature of the defendant's conduct, the net
worth of the defendant, the defendant's "expected gain" from the misconduct,
and the repeated nature of the defendant's misconduct.'
9
Although these cases showcased the Court's willingness to scrutinize
substantively large punitive damage verdicts under the Due Process Clause, the
Court had not yet taken away a punitive damage award on such grounds. The
first instance of the Supreme Court using this Due Process rubric to overturn a
jury's punitive damage verdict based solely upon its sheer size was in its
seminal decision in 1996's BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore.2° In Gore,
the Court rejected as unconstitutionally excessive a 1000-to-1 award of punitive
damages.2' In that case, the trial court had entered a $4 million punitive
damage judgment against a defendant who had caused the plaintiff $4,000 in
compensatory damages.22 The Court outlined three factors required by the Due
Process Clause for review of a punitive damage award claimed to be excessive:
"[T]he degree of reprehensibility [of the misconduct]; the disparity between the
harm or potential harm suffered [by the plaintiff] and [the] punitive damages
award; and the difference between this remedy and the civil penalties
authorized or imposed in comparable cases. 2 3 Using these criteria, the Court
was "convinced that the grossly excessive award imposed in [that] case
transcend[ed] the constitutional limit., 24 In effect, the Court embraced the
18. See TXO Produce Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443,462-63 (1993) (finding
that a 526-to- I punitive damages award was not so "grossly excessive" as to be unconstitutional,
nor was the award a result of unfair procedures).
19. Id. at 461-62.
20. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574-75 (1996) (establishing a three
"guideposts" test to determine if a person received fair notice of the severity of a punitive
damages award that might be entered against him).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 564-65. The Alabama Supreme Court ordered a remittitur to $2 million. Id. at
567.
23. Id. at 575.
24. Id. at 585-86.
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proposition that grossly excessive awards were arbitrary and thereby deprived a
tortfeasor of due process.
2 5
Joined by Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia wrote a dissent chiefly premised
upon two objections to the Court's holding. First, Scalia was bothered by the
Court's unprecedented usurpation of states' ability to punish wrongdoers
despite the absence of any procedural unfairness in the process. Scalia noted
that:
At the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, it was well
understood that punitive damages represent the assessment by the jury, as
the voice of the community, of the measure of punishment the defendant
deserved.... Today's decision, though dressed up as a legal opinion, is
really no more than a disagreement with the community's sense of
indignation or outrage expressed in the punitive award of the Alabama
jury .... 26
Quickly canvassing the jurisprudential landscape, Scalia found:
[N]o precedential warrant for giving our judgment priority over the
judgment of the state courts and juries on this matter. The only support for
the Court's position is to be found in a handful of errant federal cases,
bunched within a few years of one another, which invented the notion that
an unfairly severe civil sanction amounts to a violation of constitutional
liberties.
In addition to Justice Scalia's disdain for the Court's affront to federalism,
the other major weakness he detected in the majority's opinion was the utter
lack of any real analytical framework offered by the Court to govern the
mandated search for substantive fairness. Referring to the three guidelines as
"criss-crossing platitudes,28 Scalia observed:
Of course it will not be easy for the States to comply with this new federal
law of damages, no matter how willing they are to do so. In truth, the
"guideposts" mark a road to nowhere; they provide no guidance at all. As
to "degree of reprehensibility" of the defendant's conduct, we learn that
"nonviolent crimes are less serious than crimes marked by violence or the
threat of violence," and that "trickery and deceit" are "more reprehensible
than negligence." As to the ratio ofpunitive to compensatory damages, we
are told that a "general concer[n] of reasonableness ... enter[s] into the
25. See id. at 586 (Breyer, J., concurring) (reiterating that the Court found the punitive
damages award in that case "an arbitrary deprivation of life, liberty, or property in violation of
the Due Process Clause") (citation omitted).
26. Id. at 600 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
27. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 606 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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constitutional calculus,"-though even "a breathtaking 500 to 1" will not
necessarily do anything more than "raise a suspicious judicial eyebrow."
And as to legislative sanctions provided for comparable conduct, they
should be accorded "substantial deference." One expects the Court to
conclude: "To thine own self be true.,
29
Scalia opined that the Court's opinion elevated to constitutional status an
attack on the jury's province to determine punishable misconduct while
offering "virtually no guidance to legislatures, and to state and federal courts, as
to what a 'constitutionally proper' level of punitive damages might be."
'30
Justice Ginsburg also dissented and added her objection that transforming
punitive damages to a constitutional issue was unnecessary because of the
extensive activities of various state legislatures to enact "a variety of measures
to curtail awards of punitive damages" including the imposition of severe
statutory caps on the amount of punitive damages, requiring payment of
punitive damages, in whole or part, to the states rather than the plaintiffs, and
requiring bifurcated trials to shield juries from hearing evidence during the
liability phase pertaining only to the amount of punitive damages (e.g., net
worth evidence).3'
Seven years later, the Court reaffirmed its commitment to continue
providing substantive review of punitive damage verdicts in State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell.32  The defendant insurer had
mismanaged the third-party liability claim on behalf of its insured by refusing
to settle a serious death case and then abandoning its insured with the
admonition that "You may want to put for-sale signs on your property' 33 - -
conduct that even the tort reform-bent Court admitted "merits no praise. 34 The
jury in that case found actual damages of $2.6 million for the insured's outrage,
humiliation, and emotional distress 35 of facing the excess underlying judgment
without insurance. 36 The jury assessed punitive damages of $145 million after
hearing diverse evidence of the insurance company's bad business practices
29. Id. at 605-06 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
30. Id. at 602.
31. Id. at614.
32. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408,429 (2003) (finding a
$145 million punitive damages award "neither reasonable nor proportionate to the wrong
committed" under a due process analysis that applied the Gore guideposts).
33. Id. at 413.
34. Id. at 419.
35. See id. at 426 (commenting on the components used by the jury to arrive at the actual
damages amount).
36. See id. at 415 (discussing the jury's damages award).
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generally across the country, 37 including evidence of spying on their own
employees 38-- conduct clearly unrelated to their bad faith defense of an
insured. 39 The trial court reduced the actual damages to $1 million and the
punitive damages to $25 million.40 The Utah Supreme Court reinstated the
original $145 million punitive damages after reviewing the case in light of the
Gore factors, observing the insurer's "massive wealth," the great
reprehensibility of its many acts of misconduct, and the "statistical probability"
that the defendant would be punished in only "one out of every 50,000 cases.,
41
The U.S. Supreme Court utilized the same three-part Gore test that the
Utah Supreme Court had employed to increase the punitive damages but found
its application resulted in the opposite conclusion-neither "close nor
difficult"a 2-- that the $145 punitive award was unconstitutional. 43 With regard
to the first prong of reprehensibility, which the Court described as the "most
important indicium of... reasonableness," 44 the Court found two fundamental
problems with the trial. First, the jury had been permitted to consider conduct
of activities undertaken by the insurance company pertaining to third parties in
other states where the conduct may have been lawful.4 At most, the Court
conceded that such extraterritorial lawful conduct might be probative on issues
of intent.46 The other more profound problem was that this conduct directed at
out-of-state third parties was not related to the misconduct directed toward the
plaintiff for which the punitive damages had been awarded. As the Court
analyzed this error:
37. See id. (indicating the jury heard evidence on State Farm's national scheme).
38. See id. at 424 (indicating evidence was introduced regarding State Farm's
"investigation into the personal life of one of its employees").
39. The Court stated that the insured, at trial, had "shown no conduct by State Farm
similar to that which harmed them, the conduct that harmed them is the only conduct relevant to
the reprehensibility analysis." Id.
40. Id. at 415.
41. Id. at416.
42. Id. at418.
43. See id. (finding "it was error to reinstate the jury's $145 million punitive damages
award").
44. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996).
45. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 421 (2003) (noting
that "[a] State cannot punish a defendant for conduct that may have been lawful where it
occurred").
46. See id. at 422 ("Lawful out-of-state conduct may be probative when it demonstrates
the deliberateness and culpability of the defendant's action in the State where it is
tortious .... ).
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For a more fundamental reason, however, the Utah courts erred in relying
upon this and other evidence: The courts awarded punitive damages to
punish and deter conduct that bore no relation to the [plaintiffs'] harm. A
defendant's dissimilar acts, independent from the acts upon which liability
was premised, may not serve as the basis for punitive damages. A
defendant should be punished for the conduct that harmed the plaintiff, not
for being an unsavory individual or business. Due process does not permit
courts, in the calculation of punitive damages, to adjudicate the merits of
other parties' hypothetical claims against a defendant under the guise of the
reprehensibility analysis, but we have no doubt the Utah Supreme Court did
that here.... Punishment on these bases creates the possibility of multiple
punitive damages awards for the same conduct; for in the usual case
nonparties are not bound by the judgment some other plaintiff obtains.
47
The Court did note that evidence of related misconduct directed at strangers
would be appropriate due to prior holdings that "a recidivist may be punished
more severely than a first offender., 48 But the lack of connection between the
insurer's mishandling of the liability suit against the plaintiffs in State Farm
and the evidence of the insurer's "perceived deficiencies... throughout the
country"49 probably led to the jury's exaggerated view of the reprehensibility of
the defendant's actions toward the plaintiffs. While the Court noted that, to be
relevant for reprehensibility, conduct directed at third parties need not be
"identical," the Court stated that it cannot be "tangential.
50
In addition to using the reprehensibility factor to render unconstitutional a
jury's consideration of irrelevant misconduct toward third parties, the Supreme
Court also found under the second Gore factor that the ratio of actual-to-
punitive damages was too high.5 1 In this regard, the Court purported to retreat
from any "rigid benchmarks" and declined to "impose a bright-line ratio0 2 for
punitive damages yet immediately stated that "few awards exceeding a single-
digit ratio. . . will satisfy due process, 0 3 and reaffirmed a prior comment made
in Haslip that "an award of more than four times the amount of compensatory
damages might be close to the line of constitutional impropriety. '"5 4 Certainly
47. Id. at 422-23.
48. Id. at 423 (quoting Gore, 517 U.S. at 577).
49. Id. at 420.
50. See id. at 423-24 ("The reprehensibility guidepost does not permit courts to expand
the scope of the case so that a defendant may be punished for any malfeasance, which in this
case extended for a 20-year period.").
51. See id. at 426 (finding "no doubt that there is a presumption against an award that has
a 145-to-i ratio").
52. Id. at 425.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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compared to the first Gore factor, this presumptive single-digit ratio holding
comes across as a fairly bright-line ratio, as that is how most lower courts have
applied this holding.55
Because the $145 million punitive damages award failed both the
reprehensibility and the proportionality tests from Gore, the Supreme Court
held that the award of punitive damages was unconstitutional.56 Justice Scalia,
of course, dissented again noting his previous opinion in Gore that the due
process clause provided no substantive protections against high punitive
damage awards.57  Scalia also observed that "the punitive damages
jurisprudence which has sprung forth from [Gore] is insusceptible of principled
application."5 8  Justice Ginsburg's separate dissent criticized the Court's
application of the Gore factors as tantamount to a "swift conversion of those
guides into instructions that begin to resemble marching orders."59 In fact, in
the next case the Court dealt directly with the issue of what kind of marching
orders on punitive damages a jury must receive in order to comply with the Due
Process Clause.
In Philip Morris USA v. Williams, the plaintiff's decedent died after being
misled into smoking cigarettes manufactured by the defendant. 60 The jury
accepted the plaintiffs evidence offered at trial that defendant Philip Morris
knew of the dangers of tobacco, but engaged in an extensive publicity
campaign to mislead the public, including the plaintiff, concerning those
dangers. 61 The jury further found that defendant had "succeeded in tricking"
the decedent into believing that the media's warnings about smoking's adverse
health risks were overstated-until he was diagnosed with lung cancer and died
six months later.62 The jury found the defendant guilty of negligence and
55. One commentator who surveyed various lower court rulings after Gore and State
Farm found a fairly consistent adoption by those courts of the admonition that normally only
single-digit ratios of punitive-to-actual damages should be considered constitutional. See
generally Michael A. Nelson, Constitutional Limits on Punitive Damages: How Much Is Too
Much?, 23 ME. B. J. 42 (2008).
56. The Court briefly considered the third factor from Gore--consideration of the
disparity between the punitive damage award and other "civil penalties authorized or imposed in
comparable cases"-but was unable to find any comparable penalties for analysis and so did
"not dwell long on this guidepost." State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408,
428 (2003).
57. Id. at 429 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
58. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 439 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
60. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1060-61 (2007) (discussing the
jury's findings).
61. Williams v. Philip Morris, Inc., 176 P.3d 1255, 1257 (Or. 2008).
62. Id. at 1257-58.
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deceitful conduct (i.e. fraud) and found actual damages of $821,000 while
awarding punitive damages of $79.5 million.63 The case history following the
entry of judgment is somewhat tortured, but important to understanding the
context for the Supreme Court's opinion ultimately issued in the case.
Using the Gore factors, the trial court reduced the punitive award to $32
million but the court of appeals reinstated the original award.64 The Oregon
Supreme Court declined review and the U.S. Supreme Court remanded the case
to the Oregon Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of the State Farm
decision.65 That court was not persuaded that State Farm altered its original
analysis and so it reaffirmed its earlier approval of the entire punitive damage
verdict.66 The Oregon Supreme Court then agreed to hear the case and
considered two arguments proffered by Philip Morris.6 7 Defendant objected to
the punitive award on substantive and procedural grounds.68 As to the former,
defendant contended that a 100-to- 1 ratio was excessive. 69 As to the latter,
defendant argued that it was error for the trial court to have denied its requested
jury instruction on punitive damages that included the following language:
"[Y]ou may consider the extent of harm suffered by others in determining
what [the] reasonable relationship is" between any punitive award and "the
harm caused to Jesse Williams" by Philip Morris's misconduct, "but you
are not to punish the defendant for the impact of its alleged misconduct on
any other persons, who may bring lawsuits of their own in which other
juries can resolve their claims ....7o
Philip Morris argued that the Due Process Clause required this protecting
instruction in light of the plaintiff's arguments to the jury about the impact of
its conduct on third parties.71 The Oregon Supreme Court rejected these points
of alleged error, holding that the Due Process Clause did not prohibit a jury
from assessing punitive damages to punish a defendant for harm to third parties
63. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1061 (2007).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1061-62.
66. Id.




71. Plaintiff had argued, in part, to the jury: "'[T]hink about how many other Jesse
Williams in the last 40 years in the State of Oregon there have been .... In Oregon, how many
people do we see outside, driving home... smoking cigarettes?... [C]igarettes... are going to
kill ten [of every hundred smokers].... .' Id.
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and, further, holding that the degree of reprehensibility of Philip Morris's
misconduct justified the high ratio of punitive damages.72
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari on both issues but only
addressed what it termed the "procedural" issue concerning the requested jury
instruction.73 The Court avoided the "substantive" question of the award's
excessiveness because it found error in the failure to submit the requested jury
instruction and believed a new trial, upon remand, might be necessary.74 The
Court began its analysis indicating that the task before it was to determine
"whether the Constitution's Due Process Clause permits a jury to base [a
punitive] damage award in part upon its desire to punish the defendant for
harming persons who are not before the court (e.g., victims whom the parties do
not represent). 7 5 The Court conceded that its prior decisions had not directly
answered this question but then explicitly held "that a jury may not punish for
the harm caused to others. 76 The Court explained its three-fold rationale as
follows:
In our view, the Constitution's Due Process Clause forbids a State to use a
punitive damages award to punish a defendant for injury that it inflicts upon
nonparties or those whom they directly represent, i.e., injury that it inflicts
upon those who are, essentially, strangers to the litigation. For one thing,
the Due Process Clause prohibits a State from punishing an individual
without first providing that individual with "an opportunity to present every
available defense." Lindsey v. Nornet, 405 U.S. 55, 66, 92 S. Ct. 862, 31
L. Ed. 2d 36 (1972) (internal quotation marks omitted). Yet a defendant
threatened with punishment for injuring a nonparty victim has no
opportunity to defend against the charge, by showing, for example in a
case such as this, that the other victim was not entitled to damages because
he or she knew that smoking was dangerous or did not rely upon the
defendant's statements to the contrary.
For another, to permit punishment for injuring a nonparty victim would add
a near standardless dimension to the punitive damages equation. How
many such victims are there? How seriously were they injured? Under
what circumstances did injury occur? The trial will not likely answer such
questions as to nonparty victims. The jury will be left to speculate. And
the fundamental due process concerns to which our punitive damages cases
refer-risks of arbitrariness, uncertainty and lack of notice-will be
magnified.
72. Id. at 1062.
73. Id. at 1063.
74. Id. at 1065.
75. Id. at 1060.
76. Id. at 1065.
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Finally, we can find no authority supporting the use of punitive damages
awards for the purpose of punishing a defendant for harming others."
Because the Court believed that the Oregon Supreme Court did not correctly
grasp this constitutional principle, it remanded the case for further
consideration.78
If a jury may not punish a tortfeasor for harm caused to absent third parties
not before the court, may the jury still consider at all evidence of such impact in
determining a possible punitive damage award? This is where the Court's
holding becomes murky, the answer apparently being both "yes" and "no." The
Supreme Court held in this regard that:
[A] plaintiff may show harm to others in order to demonstrate
reprehensibility [the first Gore factor] .... Evidence of actual harm to
nonparties can help to show that the conduct that harmed the plaintiff also
posed a substantial risk of harm to the general public, and so was
particularly reprehensible-although counsel may argue in a particular case
that conduct resulting in no harm to others nonetheless posed a grave risk to
the public, or the converse. Yet for the reasons given above, a jury may not
go further than this and use a punitive damages verdict to punish a
defendant directly on account of harms it is alleged to have visited on
nonparties.
79
The Court never paused to opine on the appropriateness of Philip Morris's
requested charge but at least implicitly suggested that it might have been
appropriate, in light of its reversal.8 0 The Court concluded with the admonition
that:
Given the risks of unfairness... it is constitutionally important for a court
to provide assurance that the jury will ask the right question, not the wrong
one.... We therefore conclude that the Due Process Clause requires States
to provide assurance that juries are not asking the wrong question, i.e.,
seeking, not simply to determine reprehensibility, but also to punish for
harm caused strangers.8 '
Near the end of the opinion, the Court clarified somewhat that where there was
a risk of"confusion occurring"-which it found present in that case because of
the evidence and arguments concerning other tobacco victims-that "a court,
77. Id. at 1063 (emphasis added).
78. Id. at 1065.
79. Id. at 1064.
80. The Supreme Court did observe that Philip Morris's requested charge did distinguish
"between using harm to others as part of the 'reasonable relationship' equation (which it would
allow) and using it directly as a basis for punishment." Id. at 1064.
81. Id.
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must upon request, protect against that risk.0 2 The Court did not specify exact
procedures or instructions, instead stating that it would grant State courts "some
flexibility to determine what kind of procedures they will implement... to
provide some form of protection in appropriate cases.
8 3
While an analytical assault of the Philip Morris holding is beyond the
ambit of this Article's purpose, one must wonder how much experience the
Justices in the majority have had watching how jury trials are conducted. The
Court held that evidence of harm to strangers to the litigation could be admitted
in a punitive damage trial but that a jury must be advised of limits on how it
may be considered-that it is okay for the jury to consider the evidence of
third-party harm to show how reprehensible the tortfeasor's misconduct was,
but that the jury could not consider that same harm in order to award punitive
damages as a punishment for that harm.84 Yet the only reason for the jury to
consider how reprehensible the conduct of the tortfeasor may be is to determine
the amount of punitive damages needed to punish that tortfeasor. The jury in
such a trial traditionally has only one blank to fill in on a verdict form--a single
dollar amount that the jury may, in its discretion, require the tortfeasor to pay as
punitive damages. This evidence of third-party harm is relevant to the single
issue of punitive damages the jury will answer on the verdict form. The Philip
Morris holding essentially is to instruct juries that in answering that single
question they may consider such evidence, but that they also may not consider
the evidence. Even if this holding made sense, is there anyone who believes a
jury would understand the meaning behind this directive? To say that the
Supreme Court was trampling notions of federalism based upon a conceptual or
philosophic subtlety that no jury could possibly appreciate would be a good
starting point for a critique of the Court's opinion. Justice Stevens said as
much in his dissent, calling the majority holding a "novel limit on the State's
power to impose punishment,, 85 while relying upon a very ambiguous
distinction in the usage of this evidence of third-party harm:
While apparently recognizing the novelty of its holding.., the majority
relies on a distinction between taking third-party harm into account in order
to assess the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct-which is
permitted-from doing so in order to punish the defendant "directly"-
which is forbidden. This nuance eludes me. When a jury increases a
punitive damages award because injuries to third parties enhanced the
82. Id. at 1065.
83. Id.
84. See id. (declaring "that a jury may not punish for the harm caused others" but that a
jury "may take this fact into account in determining the reprehensibility").
85. Id. at 1066 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct, the jury is by definition
punishing the defendant-directly-for third-party harm.
86
Justice Thomas wrote a separate dissenting opinion observing that this subtle
distinction evidences that the Court's "punitive damages jurisprudence is
'insusceptible of principled application.'" 87 Justice Ginsburg's dissent, which
was joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, similarly remarked regarding the
disputed Philip Morris proposed jury instruction at issue:
Under that charge, just what use could the jury properly make of the "extent
of harm suffered by others"? The answer slips from my grasp. A judge
seeking to enlighten rather than confuse surely would resist delivering the
requested charge .... I would accord more respectful treatment to the
proceedings and dispositions of state courts that sought diligently to adhere
to our changing, less than crystalline precedent.88
Apparently, the majority of the Supreme Court must believe that a lay jury is
better able to decipher subtle constitutional distinctions than the four dissenting
Justices.
The ironic "rest of the story" from Philip Morris is that upon remand of
the case, the Oregon Supreme Court still was able to affirm the punitive
damage judgment by holding that Philip Morris had failed to preserve its
objection to the trial court's refusal by offering a proposed instruction that
complied not only with federal but with state law. 89 The Oregon Supreme
Court found deficient other unrelated language included in the proposed jury
instruction that was inconsistent with an Oregon statute. 90 The Oregon
Supreme Court held that this deficiency provided an alternative ground,
unrelated to issues of federal law, to affirm the trial court's judgment. 9' The
U.S. Supreme Court has since, again, granted writ of certiorari to further
consider the case, but only on the grounds relating to the Oregon Supreme
Court's holding based on state law.
92
86. Id. at 1066-67 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 1067 (quoting BMW ofN. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559,599 (1996)) (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 1068 (emphasis added) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
89. See Williams v. Philip Morris, Inc., 176 P.3d 1255, 1260 (Or. 2008) (articulating its
task on remand).
90. See id. at 1263 (finding that Philip Morris's proposed jury instruction "did not state
the law correctly" as required by Oregon state law).
91. Id.
92. See Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Williams, 128 S. Ct. 2904, 2904 (2008) (granting
certiorari on the state law issue, but not directly on the punitive damages award); see also
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Philip Morris, 1285 S. Ct. 2904 (No. 07-1216) (describing the
two grounds for its petition for Supreme Court review).
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III. The Viability of Punitive Damage Class Actions
While interesting issues remain unanswered after the Gore, State Farm,
and Philip Morris decisions in terms of the contours of the substantive and
procedural due process limits, the most interesting corollary issue is how these
cases impact the certifiability of a punitive damage class action. In other
words, does the application of the substantive Gore factors or the procedural
mandate of Philip Morris in some way undermine the ability of a litigant to
obtain class certification under Rule 23(b) in a case involving a claim for
punitive damages? For reasons that will be explored below, the early
prevailing scholarly reaction has thus far been that these constitutional limits on
punitive damages spell the death knell for the punitive damage class action. As
one commentator declared early in the wake of Philip Morris: "Upon
additional reflection, it seems likely that the recent Supreme Court decision
concerning the constitutional pitfalls of punitive damages awards [citing Philip
Morris] signals the end of class actions for punitive damages. '" 93 Or as another
scholar observed:
The Court's latest pronouncement on punitive damages-its February 2007
decision in Philip Morris USA v. Williams-crossed the reform divide and
has significant implications not only for how juries translate their outrage
into dollar figures, but also for class certification procedures.... [The
scholar then argues] that where harm to the class is individualized, punitive
damages cannot be pursued as a class-wide remedy. 94
This Article takes a decidedly different view of the matter.
A. Class Actions and Punitive Damages
Before tackling the nuances of the effects of the Supreme Court's due
process jurisprudence on class actions, we should begin with a brief and
focused overview of the origins, goals, and limitations of the class action device
and consider how punitive damage claims have fit imperfectly into that general
analytical model of aggregate litigation. 95 Class actions offer an unparalleled
93. Jim Beck & Mark Hermann, Williams v. PM and the Passing ofPunitive Damages
Class Actions, Drug and Device Law Blog, Feb. 27, 2007, http://www.druganddevicelaw.
blogspot.com/2007/02/williams-v-pm-and-passing-of-punitive.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2008)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
94. Sheila B. Scheuerman, Two Worlds Collide: How the Supreme Court's Recent
Punitive Damages Decisions Affect Class Actions, 60 BAYLOR L. REv. 880, 881-84 (2008).
95. For a somewhat more comprehensive overview of the class action device, see James
M. Underwood, Rationality, Multiplicity & Legitimacy: Federalization of the Interstate Class
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and unique joinder device that permits a multitude of claimants' claims to be
adjudicated together through the efforts of one or more representative
claimants.96 Without the class action device, each of these claimants would
have to initiate and prosecute their own claims separately, typically through the
efforts of separately retained and compensated counsel. Class actions can not
only achieve rather obvious and tremendous systemic and litigant efficiencies
but can, as a practical matter, make claims possible where they would not be
economically feasible on their own. As Professors Klonoff and Bilich have
articulated, class actions are thus a powerful device that can achieve
tremendous good or, alternatively, be used as an instrument of"judicial torture
or terrorism" :
9 7
In the more than three decades since 1966, when modem Rule 23 was
adopted, class actions have grown to dominate the civil litigation landscape
in a manner unexpected by all but Rule 23's most ardent supporters and
most vehement critics. Not only do practitioners attempt to use the class-
action device to address a vast range of subject areas, but the stakes at issue
in such cases are on a markedly different scale than in most traditional,
bipolar (that is, one-on-one) litigation. Class actions (and other party-
aggregation devices) are powerful and pervasive instruments of social
change.
The dynamics of class-action practice, however, have created a focus that is
unprecedented in federal civil practice. Attorneys have made immense
fortunes from class actions, and companies have been forced into
bankruptcy. As loudly as supporters have applauded the ability of
courageous plaintiffs and their innovative attorneys to use Rule 23 to right
social and economic wrongs, critics have just as vocally attacked what they
have termed attorney-driven litigation almost entirely bereft of
accountability.
98
While the modem class action device can be traced to 1966 when Rule 23
was significantly expanded, class action antecedents go back to ancient English
law sources. Professor Hensler has described these early origins as follows:
Action, 46 S. TEX. L. REV. 391, 397-403 (2004).
96. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also contemplate and permit the use of
defendant class actions whereby a plaintiff can name a defendant representative to defend the
interests of a class of unnamed potential defendants. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) ("One or more
members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all members.")
(emphasis added). Defendant class actions are a rarity and are not the focus of this article.
97. Underwood, supra note 95, at 403.
98. ROBERT H. KLONOFF & EDWARD K.M. BMIlCH, CLASs AcTIONs AND OTHER MULTI-
PARTY LITGATION 1 (2000).
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Early American courts incorporated the notion of collective action in their
codes of civil procedure. In 1833, the first provision for group litigation in
federal courts was set forth as Equity Rule 48. This rule allowed for a
representative suit when the parties on either side were far too numerous for
convenient administration of the suit; unlike the Bill of Peace, however, at
first the outcomes of such group litigation were not binding on similarly
situated absent parties. Ten years later, in a case arising out of the pre-Civil
War tensions between North and South, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
absent parties could be bound by the outcomes of cases brought under
Equity Rule 48.
The Equity Rules were overhauled in the beginning of the next century, but
the representative action device remained on the books as Equity Rule 38.
The new rule clearly stated that a representative action would bind absent
plaintiffs. Equity Rule 38 was probably the most straightforward of all the
rules adopted to date to provide for class or representative actions, stating
simply: "When the question is one of common or general interest to many
persons constituting a class so numerous as to make it impracticable to
bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the
whole." For about 25 years, this language provided the basis for class
actions in federal courts. Representative actions could also be brought in
many state courts under various state court rules.
99
As is evident from these early origins, the primary motivating principle
underlying this group litigation device was one of efficiency-so long as there
was sufficient general commonality of issues that the group needed to face in
pursuing their individual claims, both the litigants and the court could save
much time and resources by trying the claims together in one case. You might
think of the class action device as the HOV lane of litigation traffic-the more
litigants piled into the car, the speedier the process works as they head toward
final judgment. Of course these efficiency gains' 0 are recognized to be limited
by notions of fairness and respect for individual litigant autonomy:
A uniquely Anglo-American invention, being "virtually unknown in civil
law and socialist systems," class actions offer an interesting study in
competing principles. These principles include, on the one hand, the right
of an individual to make general litigation choices, such as whether to sue
and/or settle, which is generally heralded in the U.S. legal system. On the
99. DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., CLAss ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PuBLIc GOALS FOR
PpivATE GAIN 10-11 (2000).
100. As will be indicated below, some class actions can be justified as much by the
principle of achieving fairness, for either the claimants or the defendants, as by efficiency. This
is certainly true with Rule 23(b)(1)(A)-(B) certifications.
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other hand, the systematic interest in judicial efficiency is at the core of
most group litigation models.'
0'
These twin, sometimes competing principles of efficiency and fairness are
embodied in several components of the current Rule 23, such as the four
prerequisites to certification of any class found in Rule 23(a), namely
(1) numerosity, (2) commonality, (3) typicality, and (4) adequacy of
representation.
0 2
With the changes to Rule 23 in 1966, the modem class action device is
currently broken down into three basic categories of application that are
permitted by Rule 23.103 Rule 23(b)(1) covers cases where large groups of
claimants have an interest in common such that either (A) the defendant is
subject to potentially conflicting court orders regarding the subject or (B) the
resolution of one claimant's claim might as a practical matter prejudice another
claimant (the so-called "limited fund" scenario discussed below). 1 4 Rule
23(b)(2) covers cases where the class has a common interest in obtaining either
declaratory or injunctive relief, such as in civil rights or employment
discrimination scenarios.' °5 Rule 23(b)(3)-formerly called the "spurious"
class action-is the broadest category. This subdivision contemplates
certification of any case where there is sufficient commonality (the common
questions "predominate" over the individual questions) and where class
treatment is considered likely manageable and a superior device for resolution
of the disputes rather than traditional one-on-one litigation, taking into account
101. Underwood, supra note 95, at 398.
102. FED. R. Ci. P. 23(a)(1)-(4). As the Supreme Court has observed regarding the
interplay of some of these class action prerequisites:
The commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a) tend to merge. Both
serve as guideposts for determining whether under the particular circumstances
maintenance of a class action is economical and whether the named plaintiff's claim
and the class claims are so interrelated that the interests of the class members will
be fairly and adequately protected in their absence. Those requirements therefore
also tend to merge with the adequacy-of-representation requirement ....
Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 n.13 (1982). The only other fundamental
ingredient of numerosity is typically scrutinized in terms of whether the proposed class would
"achieve economies of time, effort, and expenses or promote any more uniformity of decision
than would [traditional] joinder." Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. v. Climatemp, Inc., No. 79-
C-3144, 1981 WL 2023, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 20, 1981).
103. The changes to Rule 23(b) in 1966 were intended to "shake the law of class actions
free of abstract categories ... and to rebuild the law on functional lines responsive to those
recurrent life patterns which call for mass litigation through representative parties." Benjamin
Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. INDUs. & COM. L. REv. 497, 497 (1969).
104. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1).
105. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
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various factors. 10 6 Attempts by litigants to obtain class treatment of punitive
damage claims have encountered difficulties under each of these subdivisions.
Litigants have attempted to use Rule 23(b)(1)(B) to certify mass tort
damage claims under the theory that the defendants had limited resources to
satisfy the possible multitude of claimants. This "limited fund theory" argued
that, as a practical matter, those claimants who filed suit first and received full
satisfaction of their judgments would have a negative impact on later claimants
who got to the well only to find it dry.
The most famous of these attempts arose in the context of an "elephantine"
mass personal injury asbestos litigation settlement in Ortiz v. Fibreboard
Corp. 0 7 In that case, a consortium of entrepreneurial counsel fashioned a
"global settlement" involving the establishment of a settlement fund primarily
from the defendant's insurers' contributions against which all claimants would
have to go to obtain satisfaction for their claims. 108 The trial court certified the
case as a mandatory class action under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) using the "limited
fund" rationale. 09 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed this certification holding
that the case did not present a true limited fund scenario: "We hold that
applicants for contested certification on this rationale must show that the fund
is limited by more than the agreement of the parties, and has been allocated to
claimants belonging within the class by a process addressing any conflicting
interests of class members."" 0 Among other problems, the Court found that
tort claims involving "unliquidated damages" present a problem in quantifying
the overall size of the claims and that a "fund" could not be artificially limited
by agreement of the parties but must include all of the defendant's assets,
including insurance."l'
Both aspects of the Ortiz view of a true limited fund have made the utility
of Rule 23(b)(1)(B) for obtaining class certification of a tort suit for damages
very difficult. As the Sixth Circuit held the following year in a case involving a
mass tort product liability suit:
Presumably all companies have limited funds at some point-there is
always the possibility that a large mass tort action or other litigation will
106. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
107. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 821 (1999) ("We hold that applicants for
contested certification on this rationale must show that the fund is limited by more than the
agreement of the parties, and has been allocated to claimants belonging within the class by a
process addressing any conflicting interests of class members.").
108. Id. at 824-26.
109. Id. at 815-16.
110. Idat821.
111. Id. at 850, 864-65.
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put a company into bankruptcy. Should that eventuality threaten, we have a
comprehensive bankruptcy scheme in this country for just such an
occurrence. Simply demonstrating that there is a possibility, even a
likelihood, that bankruptcy might at some point occur cannot be the basis
for finding that there is a "limited fund" in an ongoing corporate concern.
The district court cannot discharge the debt in advance of the occurrence,
thereby usurping the bankruptcy scheme through settlement, even [if] it
believes such an avenue to be in the best interests of most of the
plaintiffs. 12
Notwithstanding the Court's decision in Ortiz, there are still a few
subsequent decisions certifying punitive damage cases under a "limited fund"
theory. These courts have held that the need to "limit repetitive punitive
damage verdicts for the same behavior [might argue for a type of limited fund],
but assuming there are such limits they probably will vary from state to state,
making consideration of this factor difficult in multistate class actions."' 13 We
will consider briefly in the next section whether the Supreme Court's decision
in State Farm supports these or any additional arguments in favor of
certification under the limited fund scenario.' 14  Rule 23(b)(2) class
certification tends to be the least controversial variety of class action, at least
from a purely procedural perspective. This subsection was created in 1966 to
make clear that class certification would normally be appropriate in civil rights
and employment discrimination lawsuits seeking either declaratoryjudgment or
injunctive relief.115 The one wrinkle that courts have grappled with in this area
arises in cases where, in addition to the remedy of declarative or injunctive
relief, the putative class representative also pleads for monetary relief-
compensatory and/or punitive damages. While the subsection makes no
mention of these hybrid cases, the Advisory Committee Notes provide that
certification under 23(b)(2) "does not extend to cases in which the appropriate
final relief relates exclusively or predominantly to money damages."' 16 The
issue courts have divided over is when does a claim for monetary damages
"predominate" over the other equitable relief for which the subsection was
112. In re Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 221 F.3d 870, 880 (6th Cir. 2000).
113. RIcHARD L. MARcus & EDWARD F. SHERMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION 316 (Thomson
West 2004) (citing as examples In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1225 (9th Cir. 2001) and
the district court's order in In re Simon II Litig., 211 F.R.D. 86 (E.D.N.Y. 2002), rev'd, 407
F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2005)).
114. See infra Part III.C.
115. Rule 23(b)(2) provides for certification where "the party opposing the class has acted
or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or
corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as whole." FED. R. Clv. P.
23(b)(2).
116. FED. R. Cry. P. 23(b)(2) advisory committee's note.
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specifically crafted? Two tests have emerged from the circuit courts though the
Supreme Court has not yet resolved this analytical dispute. 1 7 Among the Ninth
and Second Circuits, the test is fairly subjective, inquiring into whether the
primary motivation for the suit is financial or equitable. The Second Circuit
asks, for example, whether "reasonable plaintiffs would bring the suit to obtain
[only] the injunctive or declaratory relief sought."'"18  The Ninth Circuit
similarly focuses upon "the language of Rule 23(b)(2) and the intent of the
plaintiffs in bringing suit.' '
9
The Fifth Circuit, by contrast, expressly repudiates that certification in this
hybrid context should "hinge on the subjective intentions of the class
representatives and their counsel in bringing the suit.' 20 Rather, given the
mandatory nature of the 23(b)(2) class, the Fifth Circuit believes the focus
should be on the extent to which the proposed class remains cohesive despite
the injection of monetary relief:
Monetary relief must be incidental, meaning that it is "capable of
computation by means of objective standards and not dependent in any
significant way on the intangible, subjective differences of each class
member's circumstances." Additional hearings to resolve "the disparate
merits of each individual's case" should be unnecessary.'21
For this reason, the Fifth Circuit (and most other federal courts) would permit
certification of an employment discrimination suit that involved requested
injunctive relief in addition to a claim for back pay 122 subject to rather easy
objective calculation (a "mechanical task") or a "one-size-fits-all refund.' 23 At
least three other circuits have indicated agreement with using the Fifth Circuit's
test of cohesiveness. 1
24
117. See Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Brown, 511 U.S. 117, 121 (1994) (expressing doubts
regarding the certifiability of claims for monetary relief except under Rule 23(b)(3)).
118. Robinson v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R., 267 F.3d 147, 164 (2d Cir. 2001).
119. Molski v. Gleich, 318 F.3d 937, 950 (9th Cir. 2003).
120. In re Monumental Life Ins. Co., 365 F.3d 408, 415 (5th Cir. 2004).
121. Id. at 416 (quoting Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Co., 151 F.3d 402, 415 (5th Cir.
1998)).
122. See Marshall v. Kirkland, 602 F.2d 1282, 1295 (8th Cir. 1979) ("Though Rule
23(b)(2) relates to class claims on which declaratory and injunctive relief is sought, this Court
has observed in conformity with the majority of federal courts, that the fact pecuniary relief in
the form of back pay is sought incidental to injunctive relief will not preclude certification.").
123. Monumental Life, 365 F.3d at 419 (finding that a claim that included request for
repayment of overpaid premiums by minorities did not destroy class cohesion because monetary
claims were subject to objective calculation that was not based upon "variables... unique to
particular plaintiffs").
124. See Reeb v. Ohio Dep't of Rehab. & Corr., 435 F.3d 639, 648-50 (6th Cir. 2006)
66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 763 (2009)
Using either test, it would appear extremely difficult to argue for
certification of a tort case where compensatory damages are almost certain to
involve individual variables and subjective information that would necessitate
individual hearings. The inclusion into such a case of a claim for punitive
damages arguably might not make certification any more difficult, but it would
do nothing to minimize the lack of cohesion present due to the actual damages
claims. Moreover, using the motivational test from the Second and Ninth
Circuits, the inclusion of punitive damages would tend to further minimize the
relative importance of the equitable relief and to point to the possible windfall
recovery of punitive damages as the predominant purpose behind the suit.
Thus, both before and after the recent Supreme Court jurisprudence on due
process limits on punitive damages, certification of a punitive damage class
action under Rule 23(b)(2) would be unlikely, and any examples of such
certification among published decisions are quite rare.
125
Rule 23(b)(3) provides for the most controversial variety of class action, in
part because it now represents the bulk of most class actions. 126 It replaced in
1966 the old "spurious" class action which was not binding on any class
members except those who took the affirmative step to "opt in" to the lawsuit
after being certified. 27 By contrast, current Rule 23(b)(3) provides for a class
action in cases with a predominance of common issues that will bind any class
members except those that affirmatively "opt out" of the suit.' 28 Given the
("[T]he reasoning in Allison dictates the outcome of this case... ."); Cooperv. S. Co., 390 F.3d
695, 720 (1 1th Cir. 2004), rev'd on other grounds, 546 U.S. 454 (2006) (quoting Allison to
support its argument); Lemon v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 216 F.3d 577, 580-81 (7th
Cir. 2000) (comparing the plaintiffs to the plaintiffs in Allison).
125. See, e.g., Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 419 (5th Cir. 1998)
(holding that individualized hearings necessary for punitive damages precluded certification
under Rule 23(b)(2) in most discrimination cases). But cf Palmer v. Combined Ins. Co., 217
F.R.D. 430, 438-41 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (concluding, after making a "difficult inquiry," that
certification in a discrimination suit involving equitable and punitive damage was possible as a
unique exception to the normal rule precluding such certification).
126. In a comprehensive empirical study of class actions in 2000 by the Rand Institute, it
was found that "the world of class actions in 1995-96 was primarily a world of Rule 23(b)(3)
damage class actions, not the world of civil rights and other social policy reform litigation
that.., the 1966 rule drafters had in mind." THoMAs E. WILLGING ET AL., EMPIRICAL STUDY OF
CLASS ACTIONS IN FouR FEDERAL DisTRicT COuRTS: FNAL REPORT TO THE ADVISORY
COMMrrEE ON CIVIL RuLES 8 (Federal Judicial Center 1996) (reporting that the Rule 23(b)(3)
damages class action comprised between 50% and 85% of all certified class actions in those
districts studied).
127. See Developments in the Law: Multiparty Litigation in the Federal Courts, 71 HARv.
L. REv. 874, 930 (1958) (describing the categories of class actions prior to 1966).
128. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) (requiring a court finding "that the questions of law or fact
common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
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power of inertia, indifference, and ignorance on the part of many class members
(particularly in smaller, so-called "negative value" consumer rights cases), this
seemingly subtle change from an opt-in to an opt-out class has been the most
revolutionary aspect of the 1966 rules changes. Comparing Rule 23(b)(3) to
the (b)(1) and (b)(2) categories, one finds in what is generally referred to as a
"damages class action" a species that is both broader and more limited at the
same time. As one court compared:
The class certification prerequisites should be construed in light of the
underlying objectives of class actions.... Rule 23(b)(3) is intended to be a
less stringent requirement than Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2). See Amchem
Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. at 615, 117 S. Ct. 2231 ("Framed for
situations in which class-action treatment is not as clearly called for as it is
in Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) situations, Rule 23(b)(3) permits certification
where class suit may nevertheless be convenient and desirable.").
129
Yet while being broader in the sense of having more circumstances where
certification might be possible, this subdivision is also more exacting because
the trial courts are required, prior to certifying under Rule 23(b)(3), to consider
issues of case manageability and whether class treatment is superior to other
traditional forms ofjoinder-that is, a party moving for certification under this
section must sell the idea of certification to the trial court.
All three of these aspects of Rule 23(b)(3) certification seem to be subject
to frequent challenge in mass tort scenarios involving claims for punitive
damages. As to the foundational showing that the common issues predominate
over individual issues-a significantly more exacting standard than the general
notion of "commonality" required by Rule 23(a)(2)--mass tort cases typically
involve injuries that are not easily quantifiable and which may be found
antithetical to the pure goal of efficiency being sought through representative
litigation in the Rule 23(b)(3) environment. The Fifth Circuit's shift from the
eager embrace of personal injury damages class actions in the 1980s to a very
skeptical view of class treatment ten years later illustrates the federal courts'
growing scorn for class treatment of mass torts.
In Jenkins v. Raymark Industries, Inc. 130 the Fifth Circuit was confronted
with a Rule 23(b)(3) certification in the context of a proposed global settlement
of thousands of asbestos cases pending in the Eastern District of Texas-a
hotbed for such litigation. These cases involved claims of strict liability,
adjudication of the controversy"); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B) (describing opting out
procedures).
129. Smilow v. Sw. Bell Mobile Sys., Inc., 323 F.3d 32,41 (st Cir. 2003).
130. See Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 469 (5th Cir. 1986) (affirming
district court certification of class with asbestos-related claims).
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negligence, and accompanying requests for both significant compensatory
damages and punitive damages. 13  The trial court refused to find a "limited
fund" scenario but certified instead a Rule 23(b)(3) class action after finding
that significant common issues predominated. 32  These common issues
included product identification, product defectiveness, gross negligence and
punitive damages.' 33 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the class certification decision,
and offered this explanation of its incentive:
Courts have usually avoided class actions in the mass accident or tort
setting. Because of differences between individual plaintiffs on issues of
liability and defenses of liability, as well as damages, it has been feared that
separate trials would overshadow the common disposition for the class.
The courts are now being forced to rethink the alternatives and priorities by
the current volume of litigation and more frequent mass disasters. If
Congress leaves us to our own devices, we may be forced to abandon
repetitive hearings and arguments for each claimant's attorney to the extent
enjoyed by the profession in the past.
1 34
Thus, the Fifth Circuit felt that "necessity"' 35 required it to begin to embrace
class certification of mass torts.' 
36
Ten years later, however, in the context of the "largest class action ever
attempted in federal court" 137 involving an attempt to secure damages caused to
131. Id. at 470-71 (recounting the history of the cases and the district court's findings).
132. Id. at470.
133. Id. at471.
134. Id. at 473 (citations omitted).
135. Id. ("Necessity moves us to change and invent.").
136. See id. at 475 ("The task will not be easy. Nevertheless, particularly in light of the
magnitude of the problem and the need for innovative approaches, we find no abuse of
discretion in this court's decision to try these cases by means of a Rule 23(b)(3) class suit.").
The Sixth Circuit concurred with these sentiments:
[T]he problem of individualization of issues often is cited as a justification for
denying class action treatment in mass tort accidents. While some courts have
adopted this justification in refusing to certify such accidents as class actions,
numerous other courts have recognized the increasingly insistent need for a more
efficient method of disposing of a large number of lawsuits arising out of a single
disaster or a single course of conduct. In mass tort accidents, the factual and legal
issues of a defendant's liability do not differ dramatically from one plaintiff to the
next. No matter how individualized the issue of damages may be, these issues may
be reserved for individual treatment with the question of liability tried as a class
action.
Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1196-97 (6th Cir. 1988); see also In re A. H.
Robins, Inc., 880 F.2d 709, 734 (4th Cir. 1989) (adopting a more "liberal" trend toward Rule
23(b)(3) certification).
137. Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 737 (5th Cir. 1996).
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cigarette smokers by tobacco companies, the Fifth Circuit changed its tune
regarding class certification. In Castano v. American Tobacco Co. 138 the trial
court certified a damages class action under Rule 23(b)(3) in which the class
representatives sought to recover compensatory and punitive damages for all
nicotine-dependent persons in the United States. 139 Specifically the trial court
certified the class on "core liability and punitive damages" and severed those
common issues from any individual damage issues.140 The trial plan included
trying the common issue of punitive damage liability and having the class jury
develop a ratio of punitive damages to actual damages which the trial court
would then apply in individual cases once the separate issue of compensatory
damages had been resolved. 14 1 The Fifth Circuit, however, reversed this order
of certification primarily on three different grounds. First, the court found that
the trial court had failed to consider in any detail possible difficult choice of
law issues that may have required ajury at the common trial to hear instruction
on, and to apply, the differing laws of all fifty states. 142 These possible
differences undercut the predominance of common issues and also
demonstrated negatives in terms of manageability of such a trial. 143 Second, the
Fifth Circuit was not impressed that the trial court had appropriately addressed
the issue of predominance generally given the individual liability issues present
on some of the claims, such as for fraud. 144 Finally, the Fifth Circuit had a
different view of the superiority of class treatment for at least this variety of
mass tort:
In addition to the reasons given above, regarding the district court's
procedural errors, this class must be decertified because it independently
fails the superiority requirement of rule 23(b)(3). In the context of mass
tort class actions, certification dramatically affects the stakes for
defendants. Class certification magnifies and strengthens the number of
unmeritorious claims. Aggregation of claims also makes it more likely that
a defendant will be found liable and results in significantly higher damage
awards.
138. See id. (reversing district court's certification of class, citing abuse of discretion).
139. See id. at 737 (noting trial court's certification). The plaintiffs had initially also
requested a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief and requested certification also under
Rule 23(b)(2). Id. at 738-39. However, the trial court denied certification under that
subsection and Plaintiffs did not appeal from that order. Id.
140. Id. at 739.
141. Id. at 740.
142. Id. at 739.
143. Id. at 740-44.
144. Id. at 745.
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In addition to skewing trial outcomes, class certification creates
insurmountable pressure on defendants to settle, whereas individual trials
would not. The risk of facing an all-or-nothing verdict presents too high a
risk, even when the probability of an adverse judgment is low. These
settlements have been referred to as judicial blackmail.
145
The Fifth Circuit has repeated these anti-certification sentiments in several
more recent decisions, indicating that Castano's skeptical view of personal
injury damage class actions under Rule 23(b)(3) was not an aberration. 46 As
Professors Marcus and Sherman have noted: "Castano can be viewed as part of
a movement in reaction against what some considered excessive use of class
actions for mass torts. Shortly before the Fifth Circuit's Castano decision,
cases in the Sixth and Seventh Circuits also imposed stricter standards on mass
tort class actions." 
147
Further coloring the landscape of certification of tort lawsuits under Rule
23(b)(3) is the controversy regarding perceived abuses of this subsection:
Damage class actions have significant capacity to achieve public goals: to
compensate those who have been wrongly injured, to deter wrongful
behavior, and to provide individuals with a sense that justice has prevailed.
But what drives damage class actions is private gain: the opportunity they
offer lawyers to secure large fees by identifying, litigating, and resolving
claims on behalf of large numbers of individuals, many of whom were not
previously aware that they might have a legal claim and most ofwhom play
little or no role in the litigation process. These financial incentives produce
significant opportunities for lawyers to make mischief, to misuse public and
private resources for litigation that does not serve a useful social purpose.
How to respond to this dilemma is the central question for public policy. 1
48
After debating these and other related issues for more than a decade, and
spurred by perceived abuses of the Rule 23(b)(3) class action, Congress finally
acted in 2005 by passing, by a rather wide margin, the Class Action Fairness
Act. 14 9 Rather than ratchet-up the requirements for Rule 23(b)(3) certification,
145. Id. at 746 (citations omitted).
146. See Regents of Univ. of Calif. v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., 482 F.3d
372, 378-79 (5th Cir. 2007) ("[C]lass certification may be the backbreaking decision that places
'insurmountable pressure' on a defendant to settle .... "); Steering Comm. v. Exxon Mobil
Corp., 461 F.3d 598, 605 (5th Cir. 2006) (affirming trial court denial of Rule 23(b)(3)
certification in discrimination lawsuit involving claims for compensatory and punitive damages
due to perceived problems with predominance and superiority requirements).
147. MARcus&SHERMAN,supra note 113, at 353.
148. HENSLER ET AL., supra note 99, at 6-7. See generally, Underwood, supra note 95, at
403-18 (discussing "the class action critique").
149. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified, in
part, at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (Supp. 2006)) (granting minimal diversity jurisdiction for class
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however, Congress primarily offered change in the form of opening the federal
courts to more state-law based class actions through a softening of the diversity
jurisdiction rules for such cases. 50 The logic behind these rather dry,
procedural reforms of a topic as heated as the perceived abuses of class actions
was that federal courts were already doing a much betterjob than state courts at
refusing to certify mass tort class actions.15' By allowing most interstate class
actions to be removed by defendants from state to federal courts, lawmakers
believed that this itself would tend to dilute the problem of class action abuse
widely reported by the mass media.
152
Thus viewed, we have seen two seemingly unrelated paths-one involving
increasing concern by the Supreme Court about punitive damage treatment in
light of both procedural and substantive due process interests and the other
involving increasing federal court hostility toward class certification of mass
tort claims giving rise to possible punitive damage awards. After Gore, State
Farm, and Philip Morris, were these two paths on a collision course and, if
these two paths were to collide, what would be the outcome?
B. Scholars and Courts at the Intersection
In the wake of the Supreme Court's recent jurisprudence applying the Due
Process Clause to punitive damages and the trend away from certification of
mass tort damages class actions, the conclusion that might be the easiest to
actions).
150. See James M. Underwood, The Late, Great Diversity Jurisdiction, 57 CAsE W. RES. L.
REV. 179, 213 (2006) (describing the impact of the Class Action Fairness Act).
151. The Senate Judiciary Committee, in considering what would later be passed as the
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, reported widespread abuse in the state courts:
The class action abuse problem has hit critical mass. Like never before, the public,
the media, and experts agree that the nation's class action system is seriously
broken, and that current practices are far from what the Framers envisioned. A
recent study commissioned by the United States Chamber of Commerce found
unprecedented support for class action reform. Major media outlets have
editorialized in favor of reform and, in many instances, in favor of this very
legislation. Further, despite the contrary claims of the increasingly dwindling ranks
of critics, the Judicial Conference of the United States has recently embraced the
notion of expanded federal jurisdiction for class actions. Likewise, the American
Bar Association now recognizes that federal jurisdiction for selected class actions
is the right fix for the growing problem of abuses.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong., Class Action Fairness Act of 2003, S. REP. No. 108-123,
at 26-27 (2003) (emphasis added).
152. See id. at 26 ("[D]efendants frequently find it necessary to remove class actions
against them to a federal forum--a forum where the threat of prejudice is significantly lower.").
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draw would be to proclaim that the punitive damages class action has a terminal
disease. That sentiment seems to best capture the early thought that has
emerged among legal scholars and commentators and has even been hinted at
by some lower federal courts' denials of certification.
Particularly following Philip Morris, some legal commentators were quick
to smell the blood and declare the death of punitive damage class actions. On
an entry at their Drug and Device Law blog titled "Williams v. PM and the
Passing of the Punitive Damages Class Actions," defense counsel Mark
Herrmann and James Beck opine that Philip Morris signaled the "end of class
actions for punitive damages." 53 This view is expressly premised upon three
debatable concepts. First, that State Farm's substantive Due Process analysis
demonstrated that the issue of punitive damages was tied to each individual
claimant's own harm as the Court embraced a requisite limit on the ratio of
punitive-to-actual damages.154 Second, that Philip Morris's admonition that a
jury could not be permitted to punish a defendant for harm caused to
"nonparties" and "strangers" to the litigation means that unnamed class
members could not have their claims for punitive damages tried by class
representatives. 55 Third, that Philip Morris also repudiated any bifurcated
class punitive damage trial whereby a defendant was forced to defend the issue
of punitive damage liability divorced from, and in advance of, its opportunity to
defend on the merits against the individual claims of each class member.
156
With these conclusions in mind, these commentators exhorted their defense
cohorts to be vigilant in attacking any certification of punitive damage class
actions: "From now on, we'll certainly be viewing anything in the trial of cases
involving punitive damages context with an eye towards preserving
constitutional objections that might not have previously existed. We
recommend that other defense counsel do the same."'
157
These arguably tainted views might be easy to discount entirely were it not
for the fact that some legal scholars have also published articles sharing at least
some of these same views. Professor Scheuerman very recently published an
article opining that "[t]he only sound reading of the [Supreme] Court's punitive
damages decisions is that we are now left with compensatory damages-only
153. Beck & Herrmann, supra note 93.
154. See id. ("[T]he great bulk of recent precedent had concluded that aggregation of
punitive damages was an unconstitutional violation of Due Process .... ").
155. See id. ("If 'strangers to the litigation' can't recover punitives, that pretty well shuts
down the logic of class actions in this area.").
156. See id. ("Williams'[s] conception of Due Process gives defendants the right to 'every
available defense' before being held liable for punitive damages.").
157. Id.
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class actions unless the harm to the class is identical."'' 58  She begins her
analysis by detecting in the Court's punitive damages opinions a shift in the
emphasis for the underlying punitive damage rationale from one of
predominantly general deterrence to one that is focused only upon specific
deterrence, being linked to, and limited by, the actual harm caused to a
particular claimant rather than the harm inflicted upon society in general:
In sum, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence has evolved from an approach
that at least gave lip service to the premise that punitive damages serve
general and specific deterrence functions to the more recent cases that have
focused, almost laser-like, not on harms to society as a whole when setting
the amount of the award, but on only the parties to the lawsuit.
159
From this Professor Scheuerman concludes that the ascertainment of a
defendant's substantive due process rights "requires an individual assessment
of punitive damages except where the class shares an identical harm ....
She rejects any class action trial plan whereby punitive damages would be
treated as a common issue and adjudicated in a bifurcated proceeding (as, for
example, was ordered in Castano by the trial court) prior to the individual
determination of either any merits-based questions relating to a particular
claimant's claim or finding of that claimant's own specific compensatory
damages:
[T]he amount of a punitive damages award is a fact-specific inquiry that
depends on the specific amount of an individual's compensatory damages
award....
158. Scheuerman, supra note 94, at 940. Professor Keith N. Hylton finds implicit within
the Court's recent decisions an even more revolutionary message that "class actions are
unconstitutional." Keith N. Hylton, Reflections on Remedies and Philip Morris v. Williams 2
(Boston Univ. L. Sch. Working Paper Series, L. & Econ. Working Paper No. 07-06, 2007),
available at http://ssm.com/abstractid=977998. He reaches what he calls this "easy"
conclusion from Philip Morris by arguing that unnamed class members are not really parties to
the litigation:
In the class action lawsuit, the class is only there in theory, not in fact. The only
real plaintiffs are the class representatives. If the Due Process Clause does not
permit a court to impose a damage award or penalty [on] behalf of "persons who
are not before the court", then it would appear to invalidate [all] class action[s].
Id. at 15. This is a pretty extreme reading of cases that did not involve, in any form, class or
other representative litigation or any contextually relevant language from the Court's opinions
stating anything close to this conclusion. It also ignores the reams of published federal court
opinions treating class members as parties to certified class actions.
159. Scheuerman, supra note 94, at 905.
160. Id. (emphasis added).
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[A]djudicating punitive damages as a common issue before a defendant can
challenge an individual class member's underlying entitlement to relief
violates the most basic procedural due process guarantees-the defendant's
due process right to present defenses to claims against them.
1 61
Professor Stier likewise reaches the conclusion that "while Philip Morris
does not itself put to death mass tort class actions, it does hasten the continuing
demise of those mass tort, punitive damages class actions with individualized
issues such as decision [sic] causation, medical causation, product use,
damages, and choice of law." 162 Professor Stier reaches this grim depiction by
linking the Supreme Court's holding that punitive damages must be tied to
individual claimant's harms with his assessment that trying as a common class
issue punitive damages prior to these individual assessments would offend due
process:
Two of plaintiffs' proposals for class-wide punitive damages awards likely
fail the due process requirements set forth by the United States Supreme
Court. Because determining the compensatory harm involves individual
assessments of liability and compensatory damages for each class members
[sic], some courts have turned to trial plans that first sought to determine
punitive damages for the entire class after hearing evidence only as to the
class representatives. Similarly, other plaintiffs' counsel have proposed
that the class action jury create a punitive damages multiplier based only on
the evidence of class representatives, and that the multiplier subsequently
be applied to compensatory damage awards determined for class members.
By stating that due process requires punitive damages to be based on the
harm to particular plaintiffs whose evidence is before the jury, Philip
Morris suggests that these punitive-first class trial plans will offend due
process-neither the multiplier nor lump-sum approach allows the
defendant to offer every available defense, nor provides sufficient
information on the extent of harm to those other than the class
representatives, such that the punitive award can be said to bear a
"reasonable relationship" to compensatory damages.' 63
This attack on what some have termed a "reverse bifurcation" process of
deciding punitive damages as a common class issue prior to individual liability
and compensatory damages is also joined by Schwartz and Appel. 64 They take
161. Id. at 907-08.
162. Byron G. Stier, Now It's Personal: Punishment and Mass Tort Litigation Afier Philip
Morris v. Williams, 2 CHARLESTON L. REv. 433, 458 (2008).
163. Id. at 445-46 (citations omitted).
164. See generally Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, Putting the Cart Before the
Horse: The Prejudicial Practice of a "Reverse Bifurcation" Approach to Punitive Damages, 2
CHARLESTON L. REv. 375 (2008).
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issue with the practice of trying punitive damages before individual
compensatory damages in a class action context:
Determining punitive damages before liability raises serious constitutional
issues. In a series of decisions, the Supreme Court has held that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment places procedural and
substantive limits on punitive damages awards to protect civil defendants
from arbitrary or excessive punishment. A reverse bifurcation procedure
violates procedural due process, because it leaves the jury to determine a
punitive damages ratio without a nexus to the defendants' conduct toward
any particular plaintiff or group of plaintiffs.
1 65
For these authors, asking a jury to award punitive damages--or at least a
punitive damage multiplier-before ajury determination of individual liability
or compensatory damages is akin to the practice State Farm and Philip Morris
condemned of permitting the punishment of tortfeasors for generally being a
bad actor or for harm caused to third party "strangers" to the litigation.
166
In addition to these scholarly attacks on punitive damages following the
recent Supreme Court jurisprudence, some lower federal courts have seen in
these decisions a justification for denying class certification of some punitive
damage cases. A very good recent example of this attitude is evidenced by the
Eastern District of Arkansas in Nelson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 167 in which the
court refused to certify a punitive damage claim under either Rule 23(b)(2) or
(b)(3) because of the presence of a request for punitive damages.168 Plaintiffs
in that case were suing Wal-Mart for racial discrimination in its hiring practices
and sought injunctive and declaratory relief along with back-pay and punitive
damages. 169 The court believed that both State Farm and Philip Morris
demanded individualized inquiries into each plaintiff's circumstances in order
to first determine if each class member could receive any punitive damages and,
if so, to determine the appropriate amount:
Even after such a finding [of engaging in a pattern of discriminatory
conduct], a jury would not be able to determine the extent of harm caused
by Wal-Mart's conduct, and as a corollary the extent of the need for
punishment and deterrence, at the class wide stage without engaging in
further individualized determinations.... Typically, a court or jury is not
165. Id. at 397 (citations omitted).
166. Id. at 400.
167. See Nelson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 245 F.R.D 358,380 (E.D. Ark. 2007) (certifying
a class for classwide liability, declaratory relief, and injunctive relief, but not for punitive
damages).
168. Id. at 373-78.
169. Id. at 374-75.
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able to determine, until [later] which alleged class members were actually
harmed by the defendant's pattern of discriminatory acts and which were
not. Thus, unless each alleged class member has actually suffered harm
from the pattern of illegal acts-which is highly unlikely-Wal-Mart
would be over-deterred by any class-wide award of punitive damages.
170
The court used this perceived problem both to defeat certification under
Rule 23(b)(2)--concluding that the punitive damage claims predominated over
the equitable relief sought-as well as to conclude that class treatment was
neither manageable nor superior for purposes of Rule 23(b)(3) certification.
1 71
Fearing that individual hearings would "swamp the litigation ', 72 and defeat the
class method as superior to traditional litigation, some other lower federal
courts have similarly concurred in rejecting certification under Rule 23(b)(3)
due to the presence of a punitive damage claim and in reliance upon the
perceived general principle of the individualized nature of a punitive damage
inquiry from the Supreme Court's recent decisions in State Farm and Philip
Morris. 1
73
C. The Case for Certification After Philip Morris
The view that State Farm and Philip Morris are hostile toward punitive
damage class actions is certainly overstated if not misguided. Such views tend
to be based upon overbroad interpretations of their application and a failure to
appreciate the Supreme Court's deepest concerns underlying these cases.
While State Farm's demand for single-digit punitive-to-actual-damage ratios
certainly throws a wrinkle into a punitive damage class action trial plan, at its
roots State Farm reaffirms that the common focus in punitive damage
adjudication remains on the defendant and also shows the advantages class
170. Id. at 377-78 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
171. Idat378-79.
172. Id. at 379.
173. See, e.g., Williams v. Telespectrum, No. 3:05CV853, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78415,
at *25 (E.D. Va. June 1, 2007) (refusing to certify Rule 23(b)(3) class seeking statutory and
punitive damages for violation of FCRA partly due to due process concerns with class-wide
punitive damage adjudication); O'Neal v. Wackenhut Servs., Inc., No. 3:03-CV-397, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 34634, at *68-69 (E.D. Tenn. May 25, 2006) (determining not to certify a class
based, in part, on the requirement that the court hear "extensive individualized damages proof
throughout a series of mini-trials" to determine whether each individual class member should
receive punitive damages and, if so, in what amount); Carlson v. CH Robinson Worldwide, Inc.,
No. 02-3780 (JNE/JGL), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5674, at *50-51 (D. Minn. Mar. 31, 2005)
(indicating that individualized factual determinations required by punitive damages claim would
undermine manageability).
ROAD TO NOWHERE OR JURISPRUDENTIAL U-TURN?
treatment offers for punitive damages in scenarios involving multiple potential
claimants. Further, Philip Morris actually creates a paradoxical problem for
traditional one-on-one litigation that virtually disappears in the class action
context, thus providing significant new arguments for the superiority of class
treatment of punitive damages. Properly understood, these authorities actually
create pro-certification arguments that suggest a possible path for resurgence of
the Rule 23(b)(3) class action. The Supreme Court may have inadvertentlyjust
breathed new life into the punitive damage class action.
A good starting point in understanding the impact of the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence on punitive damage limits is to acknowledge that the Court has
never applied these due process constraints in the context of a class action.
Even Professor Stier, who believes punitive damages class actions are no longer
constitutionally viable, concedes that Philip Morris "specifically addressed only
a plaintiff suing individually, not even commenting on the effect of the
personalized punitive damage requirement upon class actions, with its emphasis
on representation of one by another."'174 Thus, any commentary declaring that
punitive damage class actions are necessarily dead after Philip Morris is
hyperbole. Those who would, for example, equate unnamed class members
with "strangers" to the litigation-whose harm cannot be used to punish a
tortfeasor under Philip Morris-are obviously misapplying the Court's mandate
because class members are clearly bound by the results of a properly certified
class action and their claims are finally adjudicated on their behalf with the
Court's oversight and permission. 175 Class members in a certified case are
hardly strangers to the litigation as the Supreme Court has found the Due
Process Clause protects their interests in such proceedings.1
76
With regard to the idea that the Due Process Clause now rejects punitive
damage classes, one must bear in mind that "[d]ue process is flexible and calls
for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands."' 7 7 Any
perceived slight in a litigant's procedural rights would certainly have to be
weighed in view of the procedural context, the historical uses of the procedure
in question, the alternatives, and the advantages of the process entailed, for
procedural due process seldom demands perfection.178 "A construction of the
174. Stier, supra note 162, at 434.
175. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811-12 (1985) (holding that
unnamed class members have some due process rights as they are bound by the decision entered
on their behalf).
176. Id. at 811.
177. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,481 (1972).
178. The Supreme Court's seminal opinion in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust
Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) illustrates the Supreme Court's flexible approach to procedural due
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Due Process Clause which would place impossible or impractical obstacles in
the way could not be justified."'179 Opponents of the punitive damage class
action are too quick to disregard the many examples of such certified classes
and to strain to read between the lines in finding some message of abandonment
of the device. As the Supreme Court has not yet attempted to apply Gore, State
Farm, or Philip Morris in the Rule 23 context, any such absolute
prognostications as to the true impact of this jurisprudence for class actions
should be viewed skeptically.
It is also important to note that the Supreme Court has never shied away
from a view that punitive damages are about punishing the defendant to deter
that defendant and others from future related acts of wrongdoing. In Philip
Morris the Court reaffirmed that it had "long made clear that '[p]unitive
damages may properly be imposed to further a State's legitimate interests in
punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition."" 80 The Court has
also made it clear that in adjudicating claims for punitive damages the primary
focus remains on the defendant rather than individual claimants as the most
important Gore factor is the reprehensibility of the defendant tortfeasor's
misconduct.181 And with respect to ascertaining the degree of reprehensibility,
the Court has expressly stated that the focus need not be limited to a particular
claimant's harm.' 82 Thus, the Court has not retreated from the concept of
states' legitimate use of punitive damages for the purpose of providing general
deterrence from abhorrent behavior. In crafting the appropriate degree of
punitive damages to meet this goal, the focus still remains primarily upon the
defendant rather than individual claimants. Each of these considerations still
provides ample grounds for arguing that the issue of punitive damage liability
for a mass tortfeasor is one shared in common by all claimants, supporting
findings of both commonality under Rule 23(a), predominance under Rule
23(b)(3), and offering a general refutation of the suggestion that the Due
process analysis. In determining what type of notice was due a litigant, the Court emphasized
that the inquiry was one of determining the "notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to
the nature of the case." Id. at 313 (emphasis added). The Court also spoke in terms of"notice
reasonably calculated" and of "achieving a balance between these interests in a particular
proceeding" in determining when constructive notice would suffice. Id. at 314.
179. Id. at313-14.
180. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1062 (2007) (quoting BMW of N.
Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996)).
181. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996) ("[T]he most important
indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award is the degree of reprehensibility of
the defendant's conduct.").
182. Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1064.
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Process Clause declares punitive damages to be an individualized inquiry
limited to one claimant at a time.
As discussed earlier in this article, only a small number of courts, since
Ortiz, have certified a punitive damage class action under the "limited fund"
theory of Rule 23(b)(1)(B). 8 3 While some of the concerns mentioned by the
Supreme Court in State Farm and Philip Morris arguably imply a possible need
for an outside demarcation of total punitive damage liability under the Due
Process Clause and thus the legal creation of a de facto "limited fund," there is
no current Supreme Court precedent for such certification.' 84 And as discussed
earlier, it is a very difficult argument to make that any punitive damage class
should be recognized as viable under the current prevailing interpretations of
the injunctive class procedure of Rule 23(b)(2). 185 In rejecting precisely this
argument in a punitive damage case where the trial court had certified a
"limited fund" class action under Rule 23(b)(1), the Second Circuit offered a
persuasive rationale:
183. See supra text accompanying notes 103-14.
184. See Aileen L. Nagy, Certifying Mandatory Punitive Damage Classes in a Post-Ortiz
and State Farm World, 58 VAND. L. REv. 599, 601 (2005) (lamenting the fact that the
"traditional application of Rule 23(b)(1)(B) and current Supreme Court precedent interpreting
the rule may weigh against the certification of mandatory punitive damages classes").
185. See supra notes 130-36 and accompanying text. But cf Anderson v. Boeing Co., 222
F.R.D. 521, 541 (N.D. Okla. 2004) (certifying claims for punitive damages in a Rule 23(b)(2)
discrimination suit and concluding, in focusing on "the degree of reprehensibility of the
defendant's conduct," that the punitive damages claim did not dwell on individual nuances of
the class members' claims but on the defendant) (quoting Gore, 517 U.S. at 575). Also, in
Rahim v. Sheahan, No. 99-C-0395, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17214 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 18,2001), the
court observed:
To the extent that due process places a limit on the amount of punitive damages that
can be awarded against a defendant in a class action, fairness would suggest that all
class members affected by the conduct share in that amount equitably rather than
have the identity of those class members who might receive punitive damages turn
on the fortuity of whose hearings proceeded first (before the due process limit is
reached). Rule 23(b)(l)(B) seems suited to avoiding this latter result, as it
authorizes certification to avoid [this type of] risk ....
Id. at *52 n.7. Further, the trial judge in Exxon Valdez believed that a limited fund could be
established with reference to not only a defendant's assets but with reference to the "due process
[clause which] places a limit on punitive damages and, in substance, creates a limited fund from
which punitive damages may be awarded." Order No. 180 at 8, In re Exxon Valdez, No. A89-
0095-CV (HRH), 296 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (D. Alaska 2004); see also Elizabeth J. Cabraser &
Robert J. Nelson, Class Action Treatment of Punitive Damages Issues After Philip Morris v.
Williams: We Can Get There from Here, 2 CHARLESTON L. REv. 407, 423-25 (2008)
(discussing Exxon Valdez and advocating for possible certification of punitive damage cases
under limited fund theory).
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The proposed fund in this case, the [presumed] constitutional "cap" on
punitive damages for the given class's claims, is a theoretical one, unlike
any of those in the cases cited in Ortiz, where the fund was either an
existing res or the total of defendants' assets available to satisfy claims.
The fund here is-in essence-postulated, and for that reason it is not
easily susceptible to proof, definition, or even estimation, by any precise
figure. It is therefore fundamentally unlike the classic limited funds of the
historical antecedents of Rule 23.1 6
Thus, the most viable current path to certification of a punitive damage class
remains with a damages class under Rule 23(b)(3).
For the proposed Rule 23(b)(3) class action, which has been this Article's
primary focus, how else might the Supreme Court's due process jurisprudence
help make the case for certification? First, class certification of a punitive
damage class is superior to traditional one-on-one litigation when viewed
through the prism of the multiple punishment concern. A major worry the
Supreme Court has expressed with the imposition of punitive damages in
traditional litigation is the distinct possibility of redundant punishment in
multiple, distinct civil cases. This was mentioned in both Gore and in State
Farm as one of the concerns justifying substantive review of punitive damage
verdicts for fairness. 8 7 This potential problem was also front and center in
Philip Morris when the Court directed State courts to implement procedures
(e.g., jury instructions) to ensure that juries were not punishing a defendant in
one case for harm caused to someone (i.e. "strangers") other than the claimant
in that case.188 As one observer has concluded:
Although plaintiffs surely stand to gain enormously from employment of
the punitive damage class, defendants stand to lose even more in its
absence.... In the mass tort context, multiple awards ofpunitive damages
thus threaten to punish defendants multiple times for the same conduct.
Without a predictable standard of review, multiple punitive damages claims
threaten to unfairly overdeter defendants and offend due process. The
Supreme Court's standard of review for punitive damages.., makes it
clear that claim aggregation is the sine qua non of defendants' procedural
safeguards. Without claim aggregation, the Supreme Court's punitive
186. In re Simon II, 407 F.3d 125, 138 (2d Cir. 2005).
187. See BMW ofN. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 593 (1996) (Breyer, J., concurring)
("Larger damages might also 'double count' by including in the punitive damages award some
of the compensatory, or punitive, damages that subsequent plaintiffs would also recover."); State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 423 (2003) ("Punishment [considering
harm not actually caused to plaintiffs] creates the possibility of multiple punitive damage awards
for the same conduct; for in the usual case nonparties are not bound by the judgment some other
plaintiff obtains.").
188. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1064-65 (2007).
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damages jurisprudence does not serve any due process protecting purpose.
The punitive damages class is the best, and surest, option for protecting
defendants' rights against overkill damages and for safeguarding plaintiffs'
interests in equitable distribution.
189
The American Law Institute similarly recognizes the significance of this
redundant punishment danger by offering the following illustration:
Problems arise especially in the context of product litigation alleging
defective designs or warnings. ... If a defectively designed product is
unduly hazardous, it may injure hundreds or even thousands of purchasers
and users. If liability for punitive damages can be established for any of the
resulting tort claims, then such an award should be available for all the
claims arising out of the single corporate misdeed. Yet the consequence is
that beyond compensatory damages it must pay for the actual losses of its
victims, the firm will be penalized again and again for a single wrongful
judgment or action, a sanction that is antithetical to the protection against
double jeopardy that characterizes overtly penal regimes. In addition,
substantial payments for the earlier punitive damage awards may strip the
firm of its insurance coverage and assets, thus endangering the ability of
later claimants to realize their fundamental tort right to compensatory
redress. 190
While not providing an absolute fix for the redundant punishment scenario, it is
clear that class treatment of punitive damages would result in far fewer juries
attempting to punish a tortfeasor for the same misconduct.' 9 1
The second major way in which the recent Supreme Court's punitive
damage jurisprudence may be used to justify certification of punitive damage
classes lies in recognition of the paradox of the Philip Morris procedural
mandate. The dictate by the Supreme Court to trial courts throughout the land
is that the jury may consider harm to third-parties only for purposes of
reprehensibility but not for the purpose of punishing the tortfeasor defendant.
Apparently permitting evidence of such harm and arguments by plaintiffs
counsel using this evidence triggers a constitutional duty to provide some
procedural protection to the defendant from a jury's possible misuse of the
evidence. Of course the only device mentioned by the Supreme Court was jury
instructions and on this point the Court did not see fit to approve any particular
189. Semra Mesulam, Note, Collective Rewards and Limited Punishment: Solving the
Punitive Damages Dilemma with Class, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 1114, 1149 (2004).
190. 2 Am. LAW INST., REPORTERS' STUDY, ENTERPRISE RESPONSImILITY FOR PERSONAL
INJURY 260-61 n.5 (1991) (emphasis in original).
191. Of course, Rule 23(b)(3) judgments will not bind an absent class member who has
availed herself of her procedural right to "opt out" of the class and pursue her own traditional
lawsuit. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B) (discussing opting out of a class action).
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language. 192 At a minimum, this ambiguity creates a significant risk of future
reversals of punitive damage verdicts based upon nit-picky review of jury
instructions. But the problem is even more profound than that because the jury
would consider reprehensibility only for purposes of entering a punitive
damage verdict and yet the Supreme Court tells us they should not punish the
defendant in this manner. As Professor Michael Allen aptly sees this pickle:
No doubt, the Court-as well as scores of state and federal judges around
the country-will need to wrestle with Philip Morris's Delphic command
concerning the jury's use of "non-party" evidence. I have no confidence
that the courts will be able to craft a solution to the puzzle the Supreme
Court has created. I am relieved, however, that I will not be a trial judge
trying to implement that decision.
93
The paradox created by the Supreme Court's opinion in Philip Morris is
solved, at least in mass tort scenarios, by resort to the class certification method
of group litigation. By converting other victims of the tortfeasor's misconduct
from "strangers" into class members, a trial court removes the Philip Morris
shackles over the jury's use of evidence of the harm caused to them. One
scholar refers to this as the "obvious solution to the 'punishment for harm to
plaintiffs only' dictate of Philip Morris.'
94
Thus, mass tort scenarios involving misconduct by a defendant amounting
to malice or gross negligence are currently fraught with a number of inexorable
problems--( 1) redundant punitive damage punishment that Philip Morris has
not cured effectively; (2) the current trial court dilemma of figuring how to
walk the thin line of permitting evidence of harm to strangers without
permitting punishment directly based upon that same evidence; (3) the practical
risk of depletion of assets for claimants that lose the race to judgment; and
(4) the risk of under-deterrence when victims of a tortfeasor's misconduct fail
to sue. Given these problems associated with the adjudication of punitive
192. See Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1063 (2007) ("For another, to
permit punishment for injuring a nonparty victim would add a near standardless dimension to
the punitive damages equation.... The jury will be left to speculate. And the fundamental due
process concerns to which our punitive damages cases refer-risks of arbitrariness, uncertainty
and lack of notice-will be magnified.").
193. Michael P. Allen, OfRemedy, Juries, and State Regulation of Punitive Damages: The
Significance of Philip Morris v. Williams, 63 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 343, 380 (2008).
Professor Hylton argues that Philip Morris will have the following impact: "[C]reating
confusion and encouraging dishonesty, the rule of Philip Morris is unlikely to provide any
substantial benefit to potential defendants." Keith N. Hylton, Reflections on Remedies and
Philip Morris v. Williams 16 (Boston Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 07-06), available
at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=977998.
194. Cabraser & Nelson, supra note 185, at 421.
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damages-and actually exacerbated by the Supreme Court's due process
jurisprudence--the prospect of class-wide resolution of punitive damages offers
a procedure that is not only "superior" to that of traditional litigation but seems
to be custom made for resolving the problem of civil punishment.
The American Bar Association apparently agrees, as it has recommended
in the past that a defendant faced with multiple punitive damage claims be
permitted to request class treatment in federal court.195 Others also see class
certification as the remedy for some of these ailments:
When punitive damages are sought through adjudication of individual
claims, it is feared that multiple claims brought by individual plaintiffs will
over-punish defendants while giving victims who "race to the courthouse
door" a windfall not available to later claimants. For years, courts have
struggled with concerns about duplicative punishment of defendants and the
equitable distribution of such awards among plaintiffs. With the recent
influx of mass tort cases dealing with products liability, courts can no
longer ignore these issues.
The concept of a punitive damages class has emerged as a potential means
of providing distributive justice to plaintiffs, while still protecting
defendants from multiple, successive punishments.1
96
But what about the wrinkle alluded to earlier caused by the Supreme
Court's decisions in Gore and State Farm that reject the entry of a punitive
damage judgment in a vacuum removed from consideration of a claimant's own
actual harm? Some courts have referred to this as the "individualized" inquiry
that argues against class-wide determination of punitive damages and, thus,
defeats a showing that common issues predominate in a proposed class
action. 197 Of course, for every court that has declared class treatment of
punitive damages no longer constitutional, one can find another example of a
court detecting no constitutional barriers to treating punitive damages as a
common class issue. 19  The issue then turns to whether there is any valid
195. See generally AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SECTION OF LITIGATION, REPORT OF THE
SPECIAL COMMrIrEE OF PUNrTVE DAMAGES, PuNITvE DAMAGES: A CONSTRUCTIVE
EXAMINATION 71-85 (1986). The American College of Trial Lawyers has made similar
recommendations. See generally AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, REPORT ON PUNITIVE
DAMAGES OF THE COMMITTEE ON SPECIAL PROBLEMS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE (1989).
196. Nagy, supra note 184, at 600.
197. See supra note 173 (listing cases wherein the courts refused to certify classes because
of individualized punitive damage determinations).
198. See, e.g., Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 474 F.3d 1214, 1241-43 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding
that class treatment of punitive damages in "largest certified class in history" sex discrimination
case was appropriate), superseded by 509 F.3d 1168, 1188 (9th Cir. 2007); Ellis v. Costco
Wholesale Corp., 240 F.R.D. 627, 643 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (finding punitive damages were
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constitutional objection to trying as a common issue a punitive damage claim
prior to consideration of the various class members' claims involving damages
and individual liability questions. Clearly if punitive damages are so tied to
individual class members' actual damages that they must be determined at the
same time, this creates powerful arguments against class treatment.
One must be careful to avoid reading into the Supreme Court's due
process cases more restrictions on trial court dominion over procedures than
necessary. Gore, State Farm, and Philip Morris clearly establish that a
punitive damage judgment cannot be entered against a defendant in a vacuum,
devoid of any relationship to a plaintiff's actual injury. Yet, none of these cases
have intimated that the two damage issues must be tried concurrently with one
another. Thus far, the Supreme Court has merely expressed a concern that
there exist a reasonable relationship between punitive damages and actual
damages and that no punitive damage judgment should be entered without a
defendant having an "opportunity to present every available defense."'
199
While a plausible argument might be made that a class-wide lump sum
punitive damage jury verdict might be objectionable under the State Farm
dictates as too far removed from any individual harm, there is no compelling
reason why the due process clause would create a barrier to trial courts
bifurcating the punitive damage issue and allowing the jury in the first phase to
enter as its verdict a multiplier of punitive-to-actual-damages. In the
subsequent individual trials, the juries could rule on the merits of any
individual liability matters and find each class member's actual damages, thus
permitting the trial court-upon engaging in the State Farm-mandated
analysis-to then enter the final judgment using the original jury's multiplier.
This procedure expressly links any punitive damages to the actual damages
found for each individual class member and permits the defendant to try any
individual liability issues before the entry of any final judgment, thus satisfying
the twin concerns of the Supreme Court. Further, this procedure has been
adopted and approved by various lower federal courts and some state courts
around the country as consistent with the due process dictates from the
Supreme Court.2°
suitable for certification because a Title VII claim "focuses on the conduct of the defendant and
not the individual characteristics of the plaintiffs"); Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767,
780-82 (9th Cir. 1996) (approving certification of punitive damages class action as consistent
with Gore); Watson v. Shell Oil, 979 F.2d 1014, 1020-21 (5th Cir. 1992) (affirming trial court
certification order of punitive damage case).
199. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1063 (2007) (quoting Lindsey v.
Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972)).
200. See, e.g., Watson v. Shell Oil, 979 F.2d 1014, 1016 (5th Cir. 1992) (affirming trial
court certification order that called for bifurcated trial plan with punitive damage trial to set a
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For example, in the In re Tobacco Litigation (Personal Injury Cases)20 1
the West Virginia Supreme Court specifically approved of a bifurcated punitive
damage class action trial.20 2 The defendant raised the due process objections
articulated above, which the Court rejected.0 3 The concurring opinion of
Justice Starcher, in particular, provides a thoughtful refutation of any objections
by defendants to using a multiplier approach to a bifurcated punitive damage
class action trial and is worth setting forth in full:
The defendants, however, insist that the bifurcation of these cases is
improper. The defendants argue that they are entitled, pursuant to the due
process clauses of the State and federal Constitutions, to try the question of
punitive damages one case at a time, so that the jury can assess each
defendant's culpability to each plaintiff individually. The defendants insist
that the only way punitive damages may be reasonably related to the
potential harm caused to an individual plaintiff is by a jury hearing
evidence about both a defendant's conduct and the actual or potential harm
to the plaintiff at the same time. In sum, the defendants assert that punitive
damages can never be assessed ... in a class action under Rule 23.
The inherent flaw with the defendants' argument is the assumption that due
process, particularly to protect property rights, is a concrete concept.
Instead, what process is due under the due process clause is determined
under a sliding scale, and changes with the facts of each case....
The defendants argue that [State Farm] mandates that all evidence of
punitive damages must be presented to the jury and heard in relation to the
injury caused to each specific plaintiff.... The inevitable result of
accepting the defendants' argument is that it creates a judicial
administrative nightmare. The same lawyers would be working for years,
multiplier ratio for punitive-to-actual damages, and refuting defendant's contentions of due
process violations); In re Tobacco Litigation (Personal Injury Cases), 624 S.E.2d 738, 739 (D.
W. Va. 2005) (affirming certification of punitive damage class action and trial plan); see also
Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 780-82 (9th Cir. 1996) (approving trying punitive
damages prior to compensatory damages in class action as consistent with Gore); Jenkins v.
Raymark, 782 F.2d 468, 474-75 (5th Cir. 1986) (approving certification of Rule 23(b)(3)
asbestos case with a common trial on, among other things, punitive damages prior to any
individual damage trials). Cf In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:00-
1898, MDL 1358 (SAS), M21-88, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45543, at *18-22 (S.D.N.Y. June 15,
2007) (allowing bifurcated trial with punitive damage ratio being set at first set of trials).
201. In re Tobacco Litig. (Personal Injury Cases), 624 S.E.2d 738, 771 (D. W. Va. 2005)
(determining that the Due Process Clause, as interpreted by State Farm, does not preclude a
bifurcated punitive damage class action trial).
202. Id.
203. Id. at 740-41.
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probably decades, to present the same witnesses to testify using the same
documents in each separate plaintiff's case.
If the majority opinion had accepted this reasoning by the defendants, we
would essentially be saying that the more people a defendant injures with
its defective product, the less likely the defendant is going to have to pay
compensatory or punitive damages to the people injured by the product.
The defendant would therefore be accorded a right to thousands upon
thousands of individual trials that would cause the legal system to grind to a
halt. At the same time, we would be telling the individual plaintiffs that
they have no rights to any process-because of administrative gridlock, the
individual plaintiffs would de facto be denied their day in court. The
majority opinion rightly rejected this position.2
The irony in this debate is that it is the same defendant tortfeasors who cry
out against class treatment of punitive damages who are, in fact, the
beneficiaries of significant due process protection through class adjudication of
their punishment rather than facing the alternative of repeated, separate punitive
damage verdicts inflicted by separate juries for essentially the same conduct.
The fact that defendants continue to argue against class treatment of punitive
damages manifests a cynical attempt to avoid class treatment so as to create a
litigation gridlock in which to hide from judgment-hardly a goal worthy of the
Constitution's respect and certainly not a result preordained by the flexible and
practical dictates of the Due Process Clause.
IV. Conclusion
Gore, State Farm, and Philip Morris tend to be viewed both too broadly
and too narrowly. On the one hand, some commentators and courts believe
these cases inevitably signal the end of the punitive damage class action due
mostly to a perceived individualistic focus upon the impact of the tortfeasor's
misconduct upon a single particular plaintiff. This is too expansive a reading of
these cases, particularly since the Supreme Court's recent rulings on the due
process problems involving punitive damages have not come in the context of a
class action. Further, the Court, even while developing the substantive and
procedural limits on punitive damages, has expressly and consistently
articulated that its view of punitive damages has remained unchanged-that the
primary focus remains on the tortfeasor (i.e. reprehensibility) and that the
primary purpose is fixed upon punishing that tortfeasor to deter it and others
from continuing on such a course of future misconduct. If not for an
204. Id. at 748-49 (Starcher, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
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understanding of this general deterrence principle, the Court would never have
struggled to permit any continued use of evidence of harm to third parties in
Philip Morris.
On the other hand, many commentators and courts are myopic in their
failure to recognize in these decisions their demonstration of the superiority of
the class joinder device in Rule 23(b)(3) cases-a consequence that argues
strongly for the enhanced utility of class actions in punitive damage cases. In
addition to providing other systemic relief, the class device offers the best hope
for a solution to the redundant punishment problem that was itself the original
impetus for the Court's initial foray into substantive due process for punitive
damages and also renders moot the paradox of the strained Philip Morris
procedural due process holding. Properly viewed, the Supreme Court has
offered a route back toward the viable use of the class action device for
resolving mass punitive damage disputes.
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